CEO tenure and corporate misconduct: Evidence from US banks by Altunbaş, Yener et al.
CEO power and bank risk 
Yener Altunbaş, John Thornton and Yurtsev Uymaz 





We test for a link in between risk taking by US banks and CEO power, which we proxy by a CEO’s 
length of tenure and network size. We find that banks are more likely to take on excessive risks 
when CEO’s have a relatively long tenure and large network. The result is robust controlling for 
other risk characteristics of banks, governance mechanisms, and bank ownership structure.  
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A growing literature focuses on the relationship between Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) and 
corporate risk. One strand of it examines stresses how links between CEO compensation, 
shareholder value, and corporate leverage provide incentives for excessive risk taking (e.g., Chen 
et al. 2006; Coles et al. 2006; Chakraborty et al. 2007; Chava and Purnanandam 2010; DeYoung 
et al. 2013; Gormley et al. 2013). More recently, attention has shifted to the innate attributes of 
managers of CEOs and their risk-taking incentives, such as sensation seeking, overconfidence, 
education, life experiences, religious belief, and political affiliations (Bertrand and Schoar 2003; 
Hilary and Hui 2009; Graham et al. 2013; Hirshleifer et al. 2013; Hutton et al. 2014; Malmendier 
et al. 2011; Cain and Mckeon 2017). However, the literature has largely ignored the role of 
powerful CEOs in determining bank risk, which is surprising given the many ways it has been 
shown to affect firm behavior and outcomes, including financial performance (Adams, et al. 2005), 
the likelihood of engaging in earnings management (Hu et al. 2015), driving corporate acquisitions 
(Brown and Sartma 2007; Haynes and Hillman, 2010; Malmendier and Tate 2005, 2008), 
influencing the composition of boards of directors to prevent a dilution of power maintain (Combs, 
et al. 2007), shaping incentive contract design to their own advantage (Morse et al. 2011), and that 
more CEO power tends to be associated with lower credit ratings of a firm’s debt (Liu and Jiraporn 
2010). In this paper, we add to the understanding of the effect of CEOs on corporate risk-taking 
by examining the role of CEO power. A possible link between powerful CEOs and bank risk is the 
impact of CEOs on firm culture. Several scholars of organizational behaviour have suggested that 
the origins of an organizations’ culture can be found in the values and personalities of its leaders 
(Baron and Hannan, 2002; Detert, et al., 2000), and the leadership attributes of the CEO can affect 
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the culture of the firm (Berson, et al. 2007; Giberson, et al. 2009). It is quite possible that that 
culture might incline the firm towards greater risk taking, which we would expect to reflect 
characteristics of the CEO. Hence, we test the hypothesis that bank risk taking is more likely in 
banks with powerful CEOs. Based on a sample of 908 publicly listed US banks between 1990-
2015, we find strong evidence that powerful CEOs are associated with excessive bank risk taking 
while controlling for other risk characteristics of banks, governance mechanisms, and ownership 
structure 
 
2. CEO power and bank risk 
 
2.1 CEO power 
 
We focus on two measures of CEO power that have been used previously in the literature. The 
first measure is CEO tenure, which denotes the number of years the CEO has served in the same 
position, with power viewed as increasing with length of tenure because tenure builds decision-
making autonomy (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998; Combs et al. 2007). In addition, several studies 
suggest longer tenure is associated with a decrease in career concerns (Hill and Phan, 1991; 
Milbourn 2003; Zheng 2010), also suggesting that tenure is positively associated with risk-taking. 
However, we recognize that the impact of tenure on risk taking is somewhat ambiguous. For 
example, an entrenched CEO may enjoy larger private benefits from control, which could 
encourage low-risk projects (Bertrand and Mullainathan 2003; John et al. 2008; Laeven and Levine 
2009); in addition, there is some suggestion that inexperienced individuals tend to be more 
overconfident, and therefore experience may lower the level of overconfidence and reduce risk 
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taking (Gervais et al. 2011). The second measure of CEO power is network size, where the network 
denotes the number of other CEO’s with whom the CEO overlaps while in employment, social 
activities, education roles at the same company, organization, or institutions in given year. 
Networks support CEO power because of the informational advantages that they generate for 
CEOs (Madhavan et al 1998; Brass et al. 2004; Jackson, 2010; Faleye et al. 2014). By using their 
broader networks, CEO might benefit from the information advantage they have, increasing 
information asymmetries within the firm, and exacerbating the adverse selection problem that is 
one of the reasons of excessive risk taking. 
 
2.2 Measuring bank risk 
 
We employ three commonly uses measures of bank risk. The first measure is the Z score of each 
bank, which is a measure of distance from insolvency and can be summarized as: 
 
(1) Z = (k + ROA)/σROA 
 
where k is equity capital as percent of assets, ROA is the average after-tax return as a percent of 
assets, and σROA is the standard deviation of the after-tax return on assets, as a proxy for return 
volatility. The Z-score measures the number of standard deviations a return realization must fall 
to deplete equity, under the assumption of normality of bank returns. A higher Z-score corresponds 
to a lower upper bound of insolvency risk. denotes the measure of distance from the insolvency. It 
A higher z-score implies therefore a lower probability of insolvency risk. For an application, see 
amongst others, Laeven and Levine (2009). 
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The second measure describes the average stock market reaction of each bank to movements on 
the overall stock market index and is a measure of systematic risk. It is constructed using a simple 
capital asset pricing model, based on the following equation: 
 
(2)  𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
    
where, 𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the equity return of bank i at time (trading day) t; 𝑅𝑡 is the return of the S&P 500 
index at time (trading day) t; and int is the yield on the three-month Treasury bill rate at time 
(trading day) t. 𝛽0 is the intercept; 𝛽1 is the systematic risk of bank i at time t; and 𝛽2 is the interest 
rate risk. For each bank, the systematic component (𝛽1) is calculated from daily data by estimating 
the individual regressions for every quarter from 1998q1 to 2015q4.  
 
The third measure of bank risk captures the reaction of individual banks to systemic events. It 
measures tail dependence in the stock market returns of individual banks and equates the 
magnitude of tail dependence estimates as a measure of systemic risk. It is estimated via the 
marginal expected shortfall (MES) following the model by Acharya et al.  (2010) at a standard risk 
level of 5% as follows: 
 
(3) 𝑀𝐸𝑆𝑖
5% = 1 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠⁄ ∑ 𝑅𝑖𝑡  
 
where 𝑀𝐸𝑆𝑖
5% is the marginal expected shortfall of bank i in 5% worst days; 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠 is the number 
of 5% worst days in the market; 𝑅𝑖 is the average return of bank i in 5% worst days.  
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We estimate the following model of bank risk: 
𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝐸𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑁𝐸𝑇𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽3𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐺𝐸𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖𝑡 
+𝛽6𝐸𝐷𝑈𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐵𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐵𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 
    +𝛽11𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽12𝐿𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽13𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽14𝐶𝑇𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽15𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑖𝑡 
               +𝛽16𝐼𝑁𝑆𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽17𝑁𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐷𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽18𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽19𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆𝑖𝑡 𝜀𝑖𝑡               (1) 
 
In the equation, 𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖𝑡 is, alternatively, the bank Z-score, and the measures of systematic and 
systemic risk discussed in Section 2.  𝑇𝐸𝑁𝑖𝑡 and 𝑁𝐸𝑇𝑖𝑡 are the CEO power variables tenure and 
network size, respectively. We also employ other characteristics of CEOs used in firm performance 
studies, including: age, 𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡, where older CEOs may reduce firm risk through less risky 
investment policies (Serfling, 2014); gender, 𝐺𝐸𝑁𝑖𝑡, which has been shown to impact on firm risk 
behavior (Faccio et al. 2016); job experience, 𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖𝑡, where CEOs with job-specific experience in 
the same or a related industry have been shown to be associated with lower post-succession 
performance than those without it (Hamori and Koyuncu, 2014); and education, 𝐸𝐷𝑈𝑖𝑡, which has 
been shown to have a beneficial impact on financial performance (King et al. 2016).  
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The corporate governance literature also emphasizes the role of institutional mechanisms to 
constrain CEO power that in our context should act to limit bank risk. These include the size of 
the executive board, 𝐵𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡, where larger boards are viewed as likely to improve board 
monitoring capability and constrain CEOs (Conyon and Peck, 1998) and the composition of 
executive boards between outside and inside directors, 𝐵𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑖𝑡 because as the proportion of 
outside directors increases so does the independence of the board and the likelihood that it will 
constrain the authority of CEOs (Hoitash et al. 2009). 
 
The literature on bank risk suggests several bank characteristic control variables. These include 
leverage, 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡, because increased leverage is associated with more risk taking (Dell'Ariccia et al. 
2014); return on assets, 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡, because powerful CEOs of poorly performing banks could be more 
likely to take on risky projects to boost profits (Faccio et al. 2011); liquidity, 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖𝑡, where banks 
that have access to liquidity might take on more risk (Myers and Rajan, 1998); loan provisioning, 
𝐿𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑉𝑖𝑡, where increased provisioning might make funds volatile and increase risk (Sinkey and 
Greenawalt, 1991); the capital-asset ratio, 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡, because capital provides a buffer against losses 
and shareholders with more ‘skin-in-the-game’ and are expected to take fewer risks (Demirgüç-
Kunt and Huizinga, 2010; Berger et al., 2012, 2013; Calem and Rob, 1999); banks cost-to-income 
ratio, 𝐶𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡, to capture bank efficiency; and bank size, 𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑖𝑡, because compared to smaller 
banks, larger institutions could have different incentives due to the “too-big-to-fail” problem that 
might encourage larger institutions to take more risks than smaller ones (Huang et al., 2012; 
Tarashev et al., 2009; Laeven et al., 2014), and because  bigger institutions might be able to 
diversify their risks better (Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010). 
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Finally, there is a substantial literature that relates ownership structure to risk taking. One strand 
of it sees career and reputation concerns as giving managers an incentive to take less risky projects 
unless they are pushed by well-diversified, risk-loving large shareholders (Holmstrom and Costa, 
1986); Hershleifer and Thakor, 1992; John et al. 2008; Paligorova 2010). We try to capture the 
impact of investors attitudes towards risk by including the share of institutional, 𝑁𝑆𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑡, and 
individual, 𝑁𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐷𝑖𝑡, investors in total bank ownership. Another strand of the literature views 
shareholders as pushing managers to take conservative projects if the ownership is highly 
concentrated because this can better serve shareholders incentives for private benefits of control 
(John et al. 2008). We try to control for this influence by including a Herfindahl-Hirschman index 
measure of ownership concentration, 𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑡., where a more diversified ownership structure is 
expected to increase risk taking (Laeven and Levine, 2009).   
 
We present bank and year fixed effect estimates of equation (1), as well as estimates from the 
dynamic Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) panel methodology to mitigate endogeneity 
problems (Arellano and Bover, 1991; Blundell and Bond, 1998); the latter methodology also takes 




Information on publicly listed US banks is from the SNL Financial database. Data on CEO related 
variables (tenure, network size, age, CEO gender, and experience), board size, and board 
independence are from BoardEx. Bank specific information (liquidity, leverage, loan loss 
provisions, capital asset ratio, cost-to-income ratio, return on assets, and size) is gathered from 
 9 
FED call reports and the SNL Financial database. To calculate the systematic and systemic risk 
variables, daily stock prices of the banks are collected from Bloomberg. The bank ownership 
related variables are collected from Thomson One Analytics’ Worldscope. The final dataset 
includes 908 publicly listed US banks for the period 1998-2015. Summary statistics are presented 
in Table 1. 
 
4. Empirical results 
 
Estimates for equation (1) in which banks’ Z-score is the risk measure are presented in Table 2. 
The table shows fixed effects and GMM estimates, with the CEO power variables are entered 
individually and together. The coefficients on the CEO power variables are positive and highly 
statistically significant in the estimates. That is, longer CEO tenure and larger CEO networks are 
associated with an increase in bank risk taking. We interpret this as supporting the hypothesis that 
bank risk increases as CEO power increases. Risk appears to be related to CEO age and experience, 
with risk taking appearing to decline as CEO’s age and gain more experience in the job, which 
would be consistent with powerful CEOs enjoying larger private benefits from control later in their 
careers. Less well educated CEOs also appear to favor more risk taking. The results indicate that 
corporate governance institutions have some effect in constraining CEO power, with larger and 
more independent executive boards associated with reduced bank risk taking. The bank-specific 
variables indicate that banks take on less risk if they are more liquid, more highly leveraged, are 
better capitalized and are more profitable, and that an increase in loan loss provisions and bank 
size are associated with greater risk taking activities. Except for liquidity, this is broadly in line 
with what the literature suggests. Finally, the results support the view that a larger share of 
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institutional investor owners is associated with more risk taking, though greater ownership 
concentration seems to mitigate risk consistent (though the coefficients are only statistically in the 
GMM estimates). 
 
The results do not change substantially when the systematic and systemic indicators of bank risk 
are employed as the dependent variable, as reported in Tables 3 and 4, respectively. Specifically, 
CEO power, is associated with greater bank risk taking on these risk measures also. However, of 
the individual CEO characteristics, only age appears to be consistently important in determining 
(reducing) risk. Board size and board independence also constrain risk taking on these risk 
measures, and the bank-specific variables act in broadly the same manner as in the results for the 
Z-score measure of risk. Of the ownership-related variables, only the coefficient on the 
institutional investors share is consistently significant where it indicates an association with more 




A growing literature focuses on the relationship between Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) and 
corporate risk. However, it has largely ignored the role of powerful CEOs, which has been shown 
in several studies to impact on many aspects of firm behaviour and outcomes. In this paper, w\e 
examined the link between risk taking by US banks and CEO power, which we proxied by a CEO’s 
length of tenure and network size. Our results indicate that banks are more likely to take on 
excessive risk when CEO’s have a relatively long tenure and large network, which we interpret as 
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CEOs having more power. The result is robust controlling for firm governance mechanisms, other 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
Variables N Mean Median 
Standard 
deviation 
p25 p75 Minimum Maximum 
Z score 6066 23.54 17.06 23.751 6.287 32.42 -3.615 236.4 
Systematic Risk 6066 0.485 0.324 0.796 0 0.955 -21.56 13.19 
Systemic Risk 6066 -1.24 -0.72 3.163 -2.23 0.01 -20.01 20.01 
CEO Network Size 6066 5.26 5.338 1.561 4.263 6.461 0 9.169 
CEO Tenure 6066 1.392 1.548 1.058 0.742 2.197 -1.61 3.798 
CEO Age 6066 4.036 4.043 0.127 3.951 4.127 3.466 4.477 
CEO Gender 6066 0.032 0 0.176 0 0 0 1 
CEO Experience 6066 0.74 0 1.166 0 2.097 0 3.932 
CEO Education 6066 0.606 1 0.489 0 1 0 1 
Board Size 6066 11.04 10 3.869 8 13 3 33 
Board Independence 6066 0.765 0.79 0.129 0.686 0.875 0.261 1 
Liquidity 6066 23.63 21.92 12.31 15.14 30.12 0.33 86.52 
Leverage 6066 79.63 83.03 14.02 74.88 88.39 5.409 96.54 
Loan Provisions 6066 0.19 0.07 0.432 0.031 0.164 0.015 5.409 
Capital-Asset Ratio 6066 10.33 9.37 5.363 7.83 11.43 0.07 65.42 
Cost-to-Income 6066 71.38 66.9 24.18 58.99 76.94 6.36 210 
ROA 6066 0.548 0.84 1.784 0.41 1.16 -9.99 9.51 
Size 6066 0.317 -0.13 1.917 -0.9 1.023 -4.42 8.027 
Institutional Investment 6066 32.32 25.29 26.69 8.89 53.25 0.01 100 
Individual Investment 6066 13.24 8.59 13.77 3.45 18.43 0.01 90.21 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index 6066 0.044 0.016 0.095 0.006 0.031 0 0.997 




























Table 2. CEO power and bank risk: Z-score results 
  Fixed effects GMM 
 Lag of dependent variable    0.478*** 0.451*** 0.484*** 









 CEO tenure 0.598*  0.110* 0.260***  0.235*** 
 (0.321)  (0.064) (0.047)  (0.047) 
CEO network  0.143** 0.160**  0.129*** 0.401*** 









CEO age -3.937*** -0.483* -1.235** -0.515*** -0.505*** -0.372** 
 (1.053) (0.257) (0.579) (0.175) (0.185) (0.181) 
CEO gender -0.966 0.099 -0.054 -0.052 0.013 -0.038 
 (0.613) (0.376) (0.433) (0.107) (0.106) (0.104) 
CEO experience -0.198** -0.145** -0.081 -0.048** -0.055*** -0.053*** 
 (0.097) (0.057) (0.075) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) 
CEO education -0.666** -0.323** -0.419** -0.153 -0.502*** -0.0232 










 Board size -0.022 -0.102*** -0.078** -0.059*** -0.037** -0.063*** 
 (0.039) (0.025) (0.034) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) 
Board independence -1.854* -0.468 -2.169*** -1.336** -0.919 -1.274** 










Bank liquidity -0.055*** -0.009 -0.012 -0.004* -0.003 -0.004** 
 (0.012) (0.008) (0.010) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Bank leverage -0.144*** -0.059*** -0.066*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.007*** 
 (0.022) (0.010) (0.013) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Bank loan provisions 0.359* 0.833*** 0.949*** 0.088*** 0.097*** 0.103*** 
 (0.208) (0.125) (0.136) (0.034) (0.036) (0.034) 
Bank capital-asset ratio -0.707*** -0.648*** -0.594*** -0.227*** -0.229*** -0.219*** 
 (0.054) (0.040) (0.052) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) 
Cost-to-income ratio 0.001 0.003 0.002 -0.007*** -0.006*** -0.007*** 
 (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Bank return on assets -0.211*** -0.493*** -0.489*** -0.530*** -0.547*** -0.514*** 
 (0.065) (0.034) (0.040) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) 
Bank assets size 0.970** 0.983*** 0.811*** 0.596*** 0.548*** 0.581*** 













Institutional investor ownership 0.036*** 0.022*** 0.020*** 0.023*** 0.022*** 0.023*** 
 (0.009) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Individual investor ownership 0.002 -0.005 -0.011 -0.006 0.002 -0.005 
 (0.021) (0.010) (0.011) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Ownership concentration 
 
-1.453 1.093 1.027 0.000** 1.732* 1.869* 
 (1.265) (0.727) (0.876) (0.000) (1.015) (1.040) 
 Financial crisis dummy -2.101*** 2.238*** 2.232*** 1.709*** 1.733*** 1.719*** 
  (0.170) (0.069) (0.084) (0.047) (0.051) (0.047) 
 R2 0.177 0.176 0.177    
Hansen test (2nd step; p-value)    0.744 0.948 0.931 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) (p-value)    0.106 0.056 0.231 
 Observations 4987 4987 4987 3881 3881 3881 
Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses. The sample period is from 1998 to 2015. *, **, *** indicate statistical 









Table 3. CEO power and bank risk: systematic risk indicator results 
  Fixed effects GMM 
 Lag of dependent variable    0.089** 0.150*** 0.088** 









 CEO tenure 0.026*  0.031** 0.198***  0.191*** 
 (0.014)  (0.012) (0.031)  (0.028) 
CEO network  0.051** 0.030*  0.070** 0.101*** 









CEO age -0.425*** -0.184 -0.263* -0.348*** -0.325** -0.314** 
 (0.162) (0.163) (0.148) (0.125) (0.128) (0.121) 
CEO gender 0.039 0.019 0.039 0.015 0.056 0.031 
 (0.243) (0.187) (0.161) (0.079) (0.082) (0.078) 
CEO experience -0.032* -0.014 -0.024 -0.023 -0.009 -0.019 
 (0.018) (0.022) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) 
CEO education -0.015 -0.053 -0.065 -0.063 -0.287* -0.141 










 Board size -0.021*** -0.020** -0.015** 0.002 0.023 0.007 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) 
Board independence -0.357* -0.394** -0.302** 0.023 -0.085 0.072 










Bank liquidity -0.004* -0.005** -0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Bank leverage -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.003*** 0.005 0.004 0.005 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Bank loan provisions 0.034** 0.038** 0.023 0.225*** 0.183*** 0.224** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.026) (0.072) (0.070) (0.069) 
Bank capital-asset ratio -0.002 -0.006 0.006 -0.013** -0.012** -0.014** 
 (0.010) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Cost-to-income ratio -0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Bank return on assets -0.026** -0.027*** -0.02** -0.005 -0.014 -0.006 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) 
Bank assets size 0.537*** 0.525*** 0.431*** 0.116*** 0.108*** 0.122*** 













Institutional investor ownership 0.004** 0.003* 0.004** 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.013*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Individual investor ownership 0.003 -0.006** -0.001 0.002 -0.004 0.003 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) 
Ownership concentration 
 
-0.275 -0.233 -0.283 0.652 0.606 0.617 
 (0.288) (0.275) (0.257) (0.552) (0.494) (0.530) 
 Financial crisis dummy 0.108*** 0.115*** 0.156*** 0.011 0.019 0.010 
  (0.027) (0.027) (0.025) (0.031) (0.030) (0.030) 
 R2 0.238 0.237 0.237    
Hansen test (2nd step; p-value)    0.938 0.909 0.922 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) (p-value)    0.097 0.114 0.094 
 Observations 4985 4985 4985 3878 3878 3878 
Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses. The sample period is from 1998 to 2015. *, **, *** indicate statistical 









Table 4. CEO power and bank risk: systemic risk indicator results 
  Fixed effects GMM 
 Lag of dependent variable    0.422*** 0.442*** 0.426*** 









 CEO tenure 0.203**  0.144* 0.075**  0.037*** 
 (0.086)  (0.079) (0.032)  (0.014) 
CEO network  0.301** 0.344**  0.097*** 0.038* 









CEO age -2.524** -2.164** -1.966** -0.138** -1.065*** -0.599*** 
 (1.068) (0.859) (0.938) (0.058) (0.373) (0.200) 
CEO gender 1.357** 0.322 -0.659 0.181*** 0.067 0.114*** 
 (0.666) (0.768) (0.776) (0.048) (0.066) (0.037) 
CEO experience -0.337*** -0.215* -0.080 0.010 -0.022* 0.001 
 (0.106) (0.110) (0.100) (0.008) (0.012) (0.010) 
CEO education -0.607* -0.641 -0.164 -0.135 0.188** -0.099 










 Board size -0.044 -0.085* -0.009 0.003 -0.030** 0.003 
 (0.042) (0.048) (0.028) (0.007) (0.015) (0.007) 
Board independence -3.800*** -3.895*** -1.901** -2.035*** -1.669*** -1.253*** 










Bank liquidity -0.022*** -0.022* -0.027*** 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.008) (0.013) (0.008) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) 
Bank leverage -0.073*** -0.092*** -0.045*** -0.000 -0.008*** -0.005*** 
 (0.020) (0.013) (0.016) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Bank loan provisions 0.619*** 0.033 1.151*** 0.105** 0.326*** 0.133** 
 (0.119) (0.095) (0.217) (0.051) (0.066) (0.055) 
Bank capital-asset ratio -0.148*** -0.131*** -0.012 -0.007** -0.047*** -0.029*** 
 (0.046) (0.035) (0.035) (0.003) (0.014) (0.009) 
Cost-to-income ratio -0.005** -0.006* -0.004 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Bank return on assets -0.075*** -0.072* -0.074** 0.008 0.009 0.014 
 (0.028) (0.040) (0.037) (0.012) (0.011) (0.015) 
Bank assets size 0.902* 1.494** 1.071* 0.166*** 0.284*** 0.202*** 













Institutional investor ownership 0.017** 0.026*** 0.025*** 0.005*** 0.007*** 0.005*** 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
Individual investor ownership -0.031** 0.008 -0.021 -0.000 0.005** 0.004 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Ownership concentration 
 
1.173 -1.714 -0.637 -0.062 -0.249 0.079 
 (1.194) (1.109) (1.354) (0.380) (0.477) (0.382) 
 Financial crisis dummy 0.544*** -0.297*** 0.472*** -0.077*** -0.012 -0.066** 
  (0.115) (0.073) (0.140) (0.020) (0.024) (0.029) 
 R2 0.151 0.151 0.151    
Hansen test (2nd step; p-value)    0.978 0.961 0.904 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) (p-value)    0.615 0.730 0.257 
 Observations 4986 4986 4986 3876 3876 3876 
Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses. The sample period is from 1998 to 2015. *, **, *** indicate statistical 











Appendix Table. Data sources and variable definitions 
Variables Source Description 
Z score Bloomberg The inverse of the ratio of return on assets plus capital assets ratio divided by 
standard deviation of return on assets at given year. 
Systematic risk Bloomberg The average non-overlapping beta in capital asset pricing model calculated for 
each bank at given year. 
Systemic risk Bloomberg The marginal expected shortfall of each bank in 5% worst days of the market at 
given year. 
CEO tenure BoardEx The number of years the CEO has served in position at given year. 
CEO network size BoardEx The number of CEO’s with whom the selected CEO overlaps while in 
employment, other activities, or education roles at the same company, 
organization, or institution at given year. 
CEO age BoardEx The age of the CEO at given year. 
CEO gender BoardEx Binary variable equal to 1 if the CEO is female and otherwise 0. 
CEO experience BoardEx The number of years the CEO has served in the same entity at given year. 
CEO education BoardEx Binary variable equal to 1 if the CEO holds at least a post-graduate level degree 
Board size BoardEx The number of directors sitting on the board at given year. 
Board independence BoardEx The percentage of independent non-executive directors on the board at given 
year. 
Leverage Call reports  The ratio of total book value of liabilities to total assets at given year. 
ROA Call reports  
The ratio of earnings before interest and taxes (to book value of total assets at 
given year. 
Liquidity Call reports  The ratio of liquid assets to total assets at given year. 
Loan provisions Call reports  The ratio of loan loss provision to total loans at given year. 
Capital-asset ratio Call reports  The ratio of risk-weighted capital to total assets at given year. 
Cost-to-income ratio Call reports  The ratio of operating expenses to total operating income at given year. 















Herfindahl-Hirschman Index in which the total of squares of the ownership 





Binary variable that equals to 1 after the pass of the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010. 
 
 
 
 
 
